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ARTICLES
LOST IN THE FOREST OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: ELK GROVE v. NEWDOW
TODD COLLINS*
There is an old adage that one should not discuss religion or polit-
ics in polite conversation for fear of being offensive.' It has been sug-
gested that talking about these topics should be prohibited from the
workplace,2 schools,3 and even by cab drivers conducting their fares.
4
Indeed, to criticize one's beliefs in these areas may challenge their
upbringing, important values, and one's moral guidance for life itself.
This past term, the United States Supreme Court ventured into these
* Todd Collins earned his J.D. from the University of North Carolina School of
Law and his B.A. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. After
practicing law in North Carolina for several years, he currently is' an instructor in the
Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia, where he is completing a
Ph.D. in law and courts. His current research interests include constitutional law,
judicial decision making, and criminal justice.
1. See MRS. JOHN SHERWOOD, MANNERS AND SOCIAL USAGES 323 (1897).
2. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2002)(Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting); see also FRED S. STEINGOLD, THE EMPLOYER'S LEGAL HANDBOOK 1-31
(Barbara Kate Repa ed., 3d ed.)(1999).
3. See Lavine, 279 F.3d at 727 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)(noting that "such
discussions were likely to lead to hard feelings and disruption.").
4. Confessions of a Gagged Cabbie, BBC NEWS, November 30, 1999, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5435 2 5 .stm (last visited Nov. 6, 2004)(reporting that
some British authorities proposed a code of conduct for cab drivers which excluded
them from discussing sex, religion, or politics).
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two controversial topics, religion and politics.5 However, the Court
seemed to abide by the old adage of avoiding these topics altogether by
dismissing the case on procedural grounds rather than reaching the
merits of the constitutional question presented.
Undeniably, politics and religion have been joined together in our
nation's past. Religious arguments were made to forward such politi-
cal causes as the abolition of slavery and the Civil Rights movements of
the 1950s and 1960s.6 The government's role and relationship regard-
ing religion was an important concept to the founding fathers during
the creation of the Bill of Rights 7 leading to the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment." Many Establishment Clause cases, which
link religion and politics, stem from religious interaction within the
public educational setting.9 The current controversy decided by the
Court is no different. In its latest endeavor into this realm, the
Supreme Court possessed the opportunity to address the constitution-
ality of the Pledge of Allegiance,' ° particularly the controversial two
words, "under God."" Specifically, the High Court could have
answered the question, "Does a public school policy that requires
teachers to lead willing students in the Pledge of Allegiance, which
includes the words 'under God,' violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment?"' 2 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
answered this question in the affirmative, finding that 'under God'
impermissibly coerces a religious act.' 3
Instead of answering whether the Ninth Circuit reached the cor-
rect decision based on the Constitution, five of the Supreme CourtJus-
5. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). For purposes
of clarity, the general controversy over the Pledge of Allegiance is referred to as
Newdow in this article. However, when a specific opinion is discussed indication will
be given for that case. This article employs "Newdow III" to indicate the Supreme
Court holding, "Newdow I" for the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Newdow v. United
States Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) and "Newdow II," for the Ninth Circuit's
amended opinion in Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir 2003).
6. Alberto Lopez, Equal Access and the Public Forum: Pinette's Imbalance of Free
Speech and Establishment, 55 BAYLOR L. REv. 167, 171 (2003).
7. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92-93 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See, e.g., Everson v. Ewing Township Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
10. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2004).
11. Id.
12. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003)(explaining
the questions which will be considered on appeal).
13. Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 608-09 (9th Cir.
2002)("Newdow I"), amended by 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003)("Newdow I").
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tices avoided the issue by ruling that the plaintiff lacked standing to
bring the challenge. 14 By choosing to adhere to the old adage for polite
conversation, the Supreme Court left an already murky area of consti-
tutional law in jurisprudential limbo. This is true regardless of
whether the Court made this finding based on a true desire to enforce
the constitutional requirement of standing or, as some allege, the
majority merely tried to avoid a controversial issue during an election
year. 1
5
This article provides and in-depth examination of the Newdow
case and High Court's opinion. Although only concerning two words,
this controversy could have important implications for American juris-
prudence for at least three reasons. First, this issue is likely to be revis-
ited by the federal courts, as new challengers with proper standing
assuredly will come forward. 6 Second, although the amended Ninth
Circuit Court opinion that ultimately reached the Supreme Court uti-
lized only the "coercion test,"' 7 a future case may similarly force the
Supreme Court to clarify which test, if any, is appropriate for Estab-
lishment Clause analysis.' 8 Finally, a similar case may force the
Supreme Court to define how it will treat "ceremonial deism," those
historical practices and references to religion that are so common they
may have lost their religious meaning over time. How the High Court
treats the "under God" wording in a future case could open the door to
other challenges over references to God in public spheres or it could
signal an allowance for these types of references.
14. Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
15. See Linda Greenhouse, 8 Justices Block Effort To Excise Phrase in Pledge, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2004, Al; see also High Court Ducks, SALT LAKE TRIB.,June 17, 2004, at
A22.
16. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at Al (noting an interview with Michael
Newdow in which he stated other parents have contacted him about filing similar
suits); see also Charlie Savage, "Under God" To Stay in Pledge of Allegiance, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, June 15, 2004, at A2.
17. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 487.
18. See Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the
Religion Clauses, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 328 (1995)(defining constitutional "tests" as "a
standard of adjudication that is used by courts to determine whether a practice is
constitutional or unconstitutional."). In some sense the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' first opinion forced the Supreme Court's hand into more clearly defining
what test is appropriate for examining Establishment Clause complaints. By originally
deciding the case using three different Establishment Clause tests, the Ninth Circuit
may have forced the Supreme Court to decide which test, if any, the Supreme Court
would apply in future cases. Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 607. Although the amended Ninth
Circuit opinion did not use multiple tests, a future circuit court could adopt the
method used in Newdow I, thus again forcing the Supreme Court's hand.
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Four points may be gleamed from an in-depth study of this case.
First, it is clear based on this and prior cases that the Court has aban-
doned a strict Lemon test for Establishment Clause cases. However, it
is unclear which Establishment Clause test, if any, a majority of thejustices would adopt. It is this second point that could have been
greatly clarified by the Court in Newdow if the Court had reached the
merits of the constitutional claim. The third important point is that at
least five Justices appear to accept the constitutionality of "ceremonial
deism," or those public activities, such as references to God, that
indeed recognize religion but may not violate the Establishment
Clause. Lastly, given the voting blocs in Newdow, this article surmises
Justice Kennedy will be the important swing vote in similar future
cases and practitioners and lower court judges may pay close attention
to Justice Kennedy in future cases.
Section I of this article provides a brief overview of the Establish-
ment Clause's history in the High Court, with an emphasis on the dif-
ferent types of tests that have been used by the Court and examines the
concept of ceremonial deism. Section II explores a brief history of the
Pledge of Allegiance. Section III examines the facts surrounding the
Newdow case, including the lower court holdings. Section IV looks at
the events in the Supreme Court, including the procedural hurdles
leading up to the date of oral arguments, a summary of the arguments
themselves, and analysis of the Supreme Court's written opinion. Sec-
tion V then examines the possible future of this area of law and adds
some concluding remarks and examination of this case's importance.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE HISTORY
Scholars credit Thomas Jefferson with coining a phrase that sym-
bolizes at least the perceived legal standard when it comes to the gov-
ernment establishing a religion. In 1802, Jefferson wrote, "I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and State."'19
For decades, the idea of a "wall of separation" was included in the
everyday language of the Establishment Clause lexicon. As has been
noted, this phrase has become as common a legal term as "separate
but equal" or "reasonable doubt '20 However, the Supreme Court has
19. Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(quoting 8 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H. Washington, ed. 1861)(emphasis added); see also Lopez,
supra note 6, at 167.
20. Lopez, supra note 6, at 168.
[Vol. 27:1
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at times climbed over that wall, or some would say even taken it apart
brick by brick.21
Pre-Lemon Establishment Clause History
The Establishment Clause appears in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as the very first line of the Bill of Rights,
and states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion."'22 However, during the Colonial Era many thought the
Establishment Clause limited only the national government from
inhibiting a state's right to establish religion. This fact has been noted
by the Court itself, such as in Justice Black's 1947 opinion for the
Court in Everson v. Board of Education.23 In fact, not until Everson, did
the High Court incorporate the Clause to limit state governments from
establishing religions through the Fourteenth Amendment, over a cen-
tury and a half after ratification.24 Justice Black wrote the opinion,
stating
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion .... No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions .... Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organiza-
tions or groups and vice versa.
25
Justice Black's strong words would seem to indicate that the Court
would not tolerate any attachment or association between government
21. See, e.g., Charles Warren, Comment: No Need to Stand on Ceremony: The
Corruptive Influence of Ceremonial Deism and the Need for a Separationist
Reconfiguration of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 54 MERCER
L. REV. 1669, 1691-93 (2003). In his comment, Warren argues that the current
Supreme Court has become more accommodationist, allowing more instances of
public religious practices causing harm both to individuals and society.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. Everson, 330 U.S. at 9-11 (noting that individuals in the colonies were jailed for
religious beliefs and "compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support government-
sponsored churches"). See also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1437
(1990)(noting that several states had established ties with religious organizations at
the time of the First Amendment's passage, including direct "legal and financial
support for the church.").
24. Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-15.
25. Id. at 15-16.
20041
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and religious institutions. However, possibly foreshadowing the
decades of debate and confusion that followed, even with these strong
words a majority of the Court upheld a state-government policy that
seemed to, at least indirectly, support a religious institution.26 The
policy at issue in Everson involved a New Jersey statute that allowed a
local school district to reimburse parents for transportation costs to
take their children to Catholic parochial schools.27 A bare majority of
the Court upheld the policy, although there was strong dissent joined
by four justices.28
Everson marked the beginning of the modern era in Establishment
Clause cases and opened the door to a bevy of litigation. The next
year, the Court confronted the issue of "release time," a practice that
allowed students voluntary time out of class to attend religious studies
on another part of the public school's campus. 29 However, unlike the
New Jersey reimbursement policy, a nearly unanimous Court in
McCollum found that release time for religious study on public school
grounds violated the Establishment Clause. 30 The back and forth pro-
cess of trying to draw the constitutional "line in the sand" continued
with Zorach v. Clauson in which the Court, four years after deciding
McCollum, ruled that a similar release time policy was permissible if
the religious instruction was held off campus. 3' Nearly a decade later,
the Court appeared to further lower the wall of separation as it upheld
a Maryland state law, on a rational basis-type test, that required busi-
nesses to close on Sundays.32 The Court upheld the policy based on
the reasonable secular purpose of providing a day of rest, even though
that day coincided with the traditional Christian day of rest.3 3
The Supreme Court's tennis match with the Establishment Clause
continued as it decided a major case in 1962, Engle v. Vitale, one year
26. Timothy L. Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil Communion, and the
Establishment Clause, 79 IOWA L. REV. 35, 37 (1993).
27. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. See also DAVID O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
POLITICs, 665-66 (3d ed. 1995).
28. Everson, 330 U.S. at 44-45 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)(stating "[d]oes New
Jersey's action furnish support for religion by use of the taxing power? Certainly it
does, if the test remains undiluted as Jefferson and Madison made it .... Here parents
pay money to send their children to parochial schools and funds raised by taxation are
used to reimburse them .... It aids them in a substantial way to get the very thing
which they are sent to the particular school to secure, namely, religious training and
teaching.").
29. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 205 (1948).
30. Id. at 209.
31. 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952).
32. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
33. Id. at 426.
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after McGowan.34 At issue in Engle was a public school's policy of
beginning each day with a voluntary nondenominational prayer writ-
ten by the State Board of Regents.35 In finding the school prayer
unconstitutional, Justice Black, writing for the Court, noted
[W]e think that the constitutional prohibition .. must at least mean
that in this country it is no part of the business of government to com-
pose official prayers for any group .... There can be no doubt that
New York's state prayer program officially establishes the religious
beliefs embodied by the Regents' prayer.
36
Justice Black's opinion also expressed the view that the prayer was
not saved by its limitations. "Neither the fact that the prayer may be
denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance ... is volun-
tary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment
Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause ...."3 Justice Stew-
art, writing the lone dissent, noted the long history of religion in the
United States. He compared the prayer to being as harmless as the
opening of Congress with a prayer or opening the Court with "God
save the United States and this Honorable Court,"38 arguments that
would continue through the current debate and influence at least
some members of the Court in the Newdow case.
Following Engle, the Court ruled on the voluntary reading of Bible
verses and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer each day before the begin-
ning of class in Abington School District v. Schempp.39 Similar to
McCollum and Engle, a nearly unanimous Court agreed that these
practices violated the Constitution, with only Justice Stewart dissent-
ing.40 These decisions also laid out the now familiar standard that a
law must have a secular purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.41
Following the Schempp decision, the Court unanimously struck
down an Arkansas policy that banned the teaching of evolution in the
classroom. 42 At this point, the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice
Warren, had reinforced the wall of separation and perhaps built it
higher as the Court "pushed constitutional law in the direction of
34. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
35. Engle, 370 U.S. at 422.
36. Id. at 425, 430.
37. Id. at 430.
38. Id. at 446 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
39. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40. Id. at 208.
41. Id. at 222.
42. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
20041
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strict neutrality. '4 3 However, the Court's ad hoc approach failed to
provide consistent rulings or clear standards for Establishment Clause
litigation. The Supreme Court handed down "seemingly irreconcila-
ble" decisions that would strike down government support of religion
in one case while appearing "accommodationist," or tolerant of such
support, in other decisions.4 4 However, with a change of membership,
the Court attempted to clarify the Establishment Clause jurisprudence
with the Lemon test.
A "New Test": Lemon v. Kurtzman
By 1971, the Supreme Court had experienced significant change
from its membership just three years earlier when a unanimous court
decided Epperson.45 In attempting to fulfill his campaign promise of
appointing more conservative justices, President Nixon made several
changes to the Court's dominant coalition.4 6 Arguably, the most
important change was the nomination of Chief Justice Warren Burger,
who tried to lessen the restrictions of state support of religious activi-
ties and practices.4 7 Although the Chief Justice was unable to assem-
ble a stable coalition for some of his causes,4 8 he was able to establish
a specific test for the Court to utilize in Establishment Clause cases
which became know as the Lemon test.49 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,5 0
petitioners challenged laws from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that
43. O'BRIEN, supra note 27, at 657.
44. Joseph Kobylka, Leadership on the Supreme Court of the United States: Chief
Justice Burger and the Establishment Clause, 42 THE W. POL. Q. 545, 549 (1989).
45. See O'BRIEN, supra note 27 at 1521-24 (listing Justices by date of service).
Between 1968 and 1971 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Harlan, and Fortas
had been replaced on the Court by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Black, Rehnquist,
and Blackmun.
46. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON 1962-1972, 201, 316 (1989). See also RICHARD M.
NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 418, 423 (1978).
47. See Kobylka, supra note 44, at 550 (noting that Chief Justice Burger assigned
himself the majority opinion in twelve (43%) of the twenty-eight Establishment Clause
cases decided during the Burger Court, including Lemon). The Chief Justice's
influence, or attempted influence, may be viewed from the fact that a normal
distribution would be about three cases per Justice (about 10% of the opinions), if
opinion-writing tasks for the Establishment Clause cases were evenly distributed.
Even considering a continuous voting bloc of only five Justices, if evenly distributed,
each of those five Justices would be responsible for five or six opinions a piece (about
18 to 21%). Burger, however, contributed double that amount.
48. Id. at 548.
49. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
50. Two other cases were consolidated with Lemon: Earley v. DiCenso and
Robinson v. DiCenso.
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allowed both direct and indirect funding to private religious based
schools.5 ' The Chief Justice, by combining various criteria that had
been used in prior cases,52 created a three prong test to determine the
constitutionality of a challenged law or policy. To pass constitutional
scrutiny, the policy must have a secular purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits relig-
ion; finally the statute must not foster "excessive government entangle-
ment with religion. '53 In striking down the Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island statutes, Chief Justice Burger determined that these policies
failed the third prong of excessive entanglements. 54 He noted the con-
tinued involvement over annual appropriations and that future con-
flicts surrounding the programs could cause "political division[s]
along religious lines [which] was one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect.
55
Although the pro-religion policies were not allowed to continue in
Lemon, the Lemon test and its three prongs did open the door for some
other programs to survive constitutional scrutiny that may have been
struck down under prior approaches. Chief Justice Burger laid out pre-
cisely what states could do in order to hurdle the wall of separation.
While Lemon may have been the most comprehensive and thorough
Establishment Clause opinion of its time,56 what appeared to be a clear
three part test was all but opaque as the murky waters of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence continued to deepen.
Post-Lemon: New Tests or Lemon's Revision?
Following Lemon, the Court continued to go back and forth, try-
ing to draw the line over unconstitutional government conduct. Voting
coalitions changed as some policies were allowed to stand while others
were struck down.57 Practices, such as state-supplied bond money for
non-religious buildings at religious schools 58 and the loaning of text-
books from public to private religious schools, 59 were found constitu-
tionally permissible. However, state-funded tuition rebates for
51. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
52. See Lopez, supra note 6, at 184 (noting that the Lemon test combined elements
from McGowan v. Maryland, Abbington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, and Waltz v. Tax
Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) to formulate the three prongs of the test).
53. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
54. Id. at 620-21.
55. Id. at 622.
56. See Lopez, supra note 6, at 185.
57. See Kobylka, supra note 44, at 555.
58. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
59. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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attending religious based schools6 ° and state funds for religious
schools' field trips and classroom equipment were deemed
unconstitutional.6 '
As the 1970s moved into the 1980s, the ball continued to bounce
back and forth as the Court struggled with the appropriate standards,
with Lemon appearing to lose support within the Court. 62 Direct reim-
bursements to religious schools for record keeping expenses were not
allowed in one case, 63 but were upheld where the record keeping was
mandated by the state in another case.64 These conflicts have induced
current Justices on the Court to create and advocate at least two, and
possibly as many as six, Establishment Clause tests other than
Lemon.65 At least two of these new tests, the "endorsement test" and
the "coercion test" have gained some support, although it is unclear
where any majority of the Court may actually stand.
The endorsement test was first proposed by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor in a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.66 Lynch con-
cerned a city's Christmas display that included various lights, a Santa
Claus, and a nativity scene or creche. Residents brought suit, stating
the scene affiliates the city with the Christian religion. 67 The Court,
through Chief Justice Burger's opinion, held the creche did not violate
60. See Essex v. Wolman, 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
61. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
62. See Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, The Politics of Religion and The
Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 503, 505 (1992).
63. See New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125 (1977).
64. See Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
65. See Steven Gey, "Under God," The Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional
Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865, 1883 n.67 (2003); Philip Yannella, Stuck in the Web of
Formalism: Why Reversing the Ninth Circuit's Ruling on the Pledge of Allegiance Won't Be
So Easy, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 79, 89-90 (2002). Gey cites six different
tests forwarded by current members of the Court. These include the Lemon test; the
endorsement test; a narrow view of the coercion test that would be more lenient to
government actors and only prohibit direct coercion; a broader coercion test which
would prohibit all coercion, no matter how subtle, and government policies that
encourage private coercion of religion; a non-preferentialist approach where
government can favor "religion" in general as long as it does not favor any particular
religion; and a standardless, case-by-case approach. Yannella suggests even another,
more recent test bringing the total seven, including Lemon. That test, asserted by
Justice Thomas in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) noted as the "neutrality
test" appears to be merely a rewording or renaming of the "non-preferentialist"
approach and would hold that "aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or
persons without regard to their religion" would be upheld as neutral and not
indoctrinating any religion.
66. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
67. Id. at 671-72.
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the Constitution, noting that it served a secular purpose of depicting
"the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a
national holiday."68 Justice O'Connor took the opportunity to cite the
shortcomings of the Lemon test and to suggest a new rationale. She
had quickly established a leadership role after coming to the Court
and attempted to create a middle ground through the endorsement
test.69 In effect, she consolidated the purpose and effect prongs of the
Lemon test. "What is crucial is that a government practice not have the
effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or dis-
approval of religion."70 Justice O'Connor noted that a policy is not
unconstitutional if it merely has the effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion, as long as the government is not sending a message of
endorsement.7 1
Although just a concurrence, the endorsement test received fur-
ther support from the Court's opinion in Allegheny County v. American
Civil Liberties Union.72 Allegheny also concerned holiday displays,
including a creche and a menorah display. In writing the opinion for
the Court, Justice Blackmun noted "five Justices in concurrence and
dissent in Lynch agreed upon the relevant constitutional principles: the
government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has
the effect of endorsing religious beliefs .. .
Aside from the Lemon and endorsement tests, the Court has also
recognized a "coercion test." In Lee v. Weisman the Court determined
the constitutionality of a public school's practice of clergy-led prayers
at graduation ceremonies.7" Writing for a bare majority of the Court,
Justice Kennedy struck down the school's policy, noting that "subtle
coercive pressures exist[ed]" such that "the student had no real alter-
native which would have allowed her to avoid the fact or appearance of
participation. '75  Kennedy did not overturn the Lemon nor the
endorsement tests, but instead looked to the coercive effects the policy
had on the students. In a strong dissent authored by Justice Scalia and
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas,
Scalia noted the historical importance of prayers in official ceremo-
68. Id. at 680.
69. See Paula Arledge & Edward Heck, A Freshman Justice Confronts the
Constitution: Justice O'Connor and the First Amendment, 45 THE W. POL. Q. 761, 767-68
(1992).
70. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
73. Id. at 597.
74. 505 U.S. 577 (1992)(5-4 decision).
75. Id. at 588.
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nies.76 Scalia believed there was no coercion in this case because
opposing individuals were free to not participate, and in his view coer-
cion only occurs when those that do not participate face some type of
sanctions "by force of law."7 7
In the current "under God" controversy, the question of which one
or combination of tests the Supreme Court should use may have been
more important than the outcome of the case itself. Although it is
clear that the Court may no longer rely solely on Lemon, of the seven
possible tests recently forwarded by current members of the Court, 78 if
any one test had been chosen and utilized by the Court, then Elk Grove
v. Newdow could have reestablished the landscape for this bewildering
area of law. Yet by avoiding the constitutional issue in this case, the
High Court provides no more clarification in this area of jurispru-
dence.79 This outcome will no doubt contribute to the confusion with
the Establishment Clause and may have given some credibility to one
current Justice's public description of this area of jurisprudence as
"embarrassing."80 This makes the job of practitioners and lower court
judges more difficult as they lack the significant guidance needed from
the High Court.
Ceremonial Deism
Aside from the aforementioned cases defining the Establishment
Clause's treatment by the Court, another line of relevant cases deals
with the idea of "ceremonial deism." Ceremonial deism generally
76. Id. at 633-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 641.
78. See supra note 65.
79. Other recent cases also provide little guidance through the Establishment
Clause jungle. In one recent case concerning student-led prayers before high school
football games, the Court appeared to use pieces of the Lemon, endorsement, and
coercion tests. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 299-302, 308, 314-15
(2000). In another case decided this term, concerning both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause, the majority opinion failed to use any previously
recognized Establishment Clause test. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). In
Locke, the issue surrounded Washington State's Promise Scholarship which provided
college funding to citizens with the stipulation that the money could not be used to
pursue a degree in theology, although it could be used at non-public religious colleges.
Davey received the scholarship, was seeking a degree in theology, was informed he
could not use the scholarship for a theology degree, and sued the state on both Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause grounds. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, upheld the state's practice and said it did not violate either clause. Although
more focus was on the Free Exercise Clause, when dealing with the Establishment
Clause the Chief Justice's language did not signify any specific test.
80. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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refers to long held practices that may contain some religious content
but may in fact be constitutionally permissible.81 The idea incorpo-
rates two arguments: that some practices common in society, contain-
ing some reference to religion, merely show religion's place in the
founding of the nation and therefore are more akin to historical state-
ments, or the message is so vague and repeated so often that it loses its
religious message altogether. This definition stems largely from the
Court's first use of the phrase by Justice Brennan, dissenting in
Lynch. 8 2 Justice Brennan noted that some practices "have lost through
rote repetition any significant religious content. 8s 3 Interestingly for the
present debate, Justice Brennan included "references to God contained
in the Pledge of Allegiance" as one of those practices that has lost its
religious content.8 4 Although not using the term ceremonial deism, in
the same case Justice O'Connor noted that such practices as printing
"In God We Trust" on coins and opening the Court sessions with "God
save the United States . . ." may acknowledge religion, but serve, in the
only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular
purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in
the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appre-
ciation in society. For that reason, and because of their history and
ubiquity, those practices are not understood as conveying government
approval of particular religious beliefs.85
The term, however, has not been adopted in a majority opinion by
the Court.
86
In Marsh v. Chambers the Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska
state legislature's practice of opening each session with a prayer.
8 7
Similar to the Christmas displays at issue in Lynch, the Court found
81. See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking The Constitutionality of Ceremonial
Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2091 (1996)(noting Yale Law School Dean Walter
Rostow's 1962 lecture in which he reportedly defined acts of ceremonial deism as a
"class of public activity, which ... could be accepted as so conventional and
uncontroversial as to be constitutional."); Arnold H. Loewy, The Positive Reality and
Normative Virtues of a "Neutral" Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 533, 541 n.60
(2003).
82. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (1984)(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Epstein, supra
note 81, at 2091-94 (citations omitted).
83. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority in Lynch, also noted that the Pledge of Allegiance contains religious references
as one of the many examples of official references to the value of Divine guidance. Id.
at 676.
86. See Yannella, supra note 65, at 79, 93.
87. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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that the practice was acceptable based in part on the long standing
tradition and historical acceptance of the practice and that it had
become "part of the fabric of our society."88 Although not using the
specific term, the Court upheld the legislative prayer on what could be
described as ceremonial deism grounds of historical usage and relig-
ious vagueness.
Ceremonial deism, as can be expected, has been criticized on both
sides of the debate. On one hand, allowing certain religious references
in public ceremonies could lead to intolerance and ostracism of indi-
viduals who may not share such religious beliefs, or any religious
beliefs at all.8 9 These individuals could radiate into insular groups
excluding themselves from other aspects of the public sphere and per-
haps make them lose respect for the entire political and legal system.90
Even if facially neutral toward religion, some have argued that all pub-
lic religious acts are in some way preferential. 9' Further, one can eas-
ily imagine a slippery-slope effect where more religious activities
become incorporated into public activities, creating an almost subcon-
scious or subliminal establishment of religion.
On the other hand, to say that terms such as "under God" have
lost their religious meaning may undermine the integrity of religion
and diminish the ritualistic and symbolic importance of such terms. 92
One can imagine other phrases in our lexicon that have similarly lost
some of their meaning due to vast repetition. For example, when a
store check-out clerk says "have a nice day" to the three-hundred cus-
tomers that pass through, does any customer truly feel the well-wishes
of that person or has the phrase merely become so common that it is
almost, if not totally, ignored? In either event, an appeal to ceremonial
deism appears to satisfy neither side of the debate.
The Double-Edged Sword of History
While ceremonial deism is tied partly to an appeal to history, his-
tory has also been a means for some practices to be struck-down as
88. Id. at 792.
89. See Warren, supra note 21, at 1697-1706 (2003).
90. Hall, supra note 26, at 81.
91. See Hall, supra note 26, at 56 (noting that, at least for public prayers, "[e]very
prayer is preferential, even so called 'nondenomational' or 'nonsectarian' prayers ....
At best, they create majority support by appealing to a broader coalition of religious
faiths.").
92. See Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEx. REv.
L. & POL. 41, 48 (2003)(noting that making these words routine may "[empty]
religious phrases of their religious meaning. If that is the price of upholding religious
elements in government ceremonies, it is not worth paying.").
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unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has examined the legislative his-
tory of some challenged statutes and if the Court found a religious
intent in the passage of the statute, the Court used that intent to find a
constitutional violation. A good example of this practice involved the
Court's ruling in Wallace v. Jaffree. 3 Wallace concerned an Alabama
statute that required each school day to begin with a moment of
silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer."' 94 Looking at the "secular
purpose" prong of the Lemon test, the Court examined the legislative
history of the statute and found several instances of the legislature's
religious intent in passing the statute, rather than the required secular
purpose.95 Part of the legislature's religious intent was also shown by
the fact that the statute had originally been enacted without the "volun-
tary prayer" language. 96 This change indicated to the Court "that the
State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice." 97 Thus,
while history and tradition may insulate some practices from constitu-
tional scrutiny under the rubric of ceremonial deism, the legislative
history may in fact show a practice or statute to be incompatible with
the Constitution.
II. HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
In the late 1800s, many fraternal societies and groups were form-
ing with largely immigrant memberships.9" To diminish their status as
immigrants and to promote group unity, many of these groups became
publicly patriotic, often using the American flag as a key symbol. 99
Partly due to this wave of flag usage, in 1892 Francis Bellamy wrote
what is today known as the "Pledge of Allegiance" which was first pub-
lished in a magazine called The Youth's Companion.100 Originally, the
93. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
94. Id. at 40.
95. Id. at 56-57 (noting the Court found that the bill's sponsor "inserted into the
legislative record... a statement indicating that the legislation was an 'effort to return
voluntary prayer' to the public schools." The sponsor also testified at the District
Court level that he had "no other purpose in mind" when sponsoring the statute other
than advancing prayer in school.).
96. Id. at 60.
97. Id.
98. See CHRISTOPHER J. KAUFFMAN, PATRIOTISM AND FRATERNALISM IN THE KNIGHTS OF
COLUMBUS 12 (2001).
99. Id.
100. See Gey, supra note 65, at 1874.
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Pledge did not mention the words "under God."' 0'1 Congress adopted
these words, as written by Bellamy, as the official Pledge of Allegiance
by statute in 1942.102
In 1881, a New Haven, Connecticut Catholic-based fraternal
organization called the Knights of Columbus held their first meet-
ing.10 3 The group selected Christopher Columbus as their namesake
to emphasize that the roots of American society stemmed from its dis-
covery by the heroic Catholic explorer.' 4 Within twenty-five years, the
organization had grown tremendously and possessed members in
every state.10 5 In reaction to anti-Catholic sentiment, the Knights of
Columbus' patriotic expressions increased, as patriotism became one
of the groups four main principles.'0 6 The Knights of Columbus
strongly attacked communism and the American Communist Party,
which it viewed as being anti-Catholic, a "Satanic Scourge," and lead-
ing to the "decline in the moral fiber in America.' 1 0 7
Out of their patriotism and as a showing against communism, the
Knights of Columbus began adding the phrase "under God" during the
recitation of the Pledge in their ceremonies. By 1951, the Board of
Directors of the Knights adopted the new wording and mandated that
all official functions include the new language. 108 In 1952, the
Knights of Columbus began lobbying Congress and President Eisen-
hower to amend the language of the Pledge to include "under God."' 0 9
Appropriately, on Flag Day, June 14, 1954, President Eisenhower
signed a bill into law that added the "under God" language to the
Pledge.11o
101. See id. at 1875. As originally written, the Pledge stated, "I pledge allegiance to
my flag and to the Republic for which it stands- one nation indivisible - with liberty
and justice for all." (emphasis added).
102. Pub. L. No. 77-623, 56 Stat. 377, 380 (1942) (now codified 4 U.S.C. § 4
(2004)).
103. CHRISTOPHER J. KAUFFMAN, FAITH AND FRATERNALISM, THE HISTORY OF THE
KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS, 1882-1982 (1982).
104. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 98, at 2.
105. KAUFFMAN, supra note 103, at 1.
106. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 98, at 2, 5-7, 14, 19 (noting the four principles as
unity, charity, fraternalism, and patriotism).
107. KAUFFMAN, supra note 103, at 294, 360, 363-65 (noting that the Knights of
Columbus conducted several activities in their efforts to thwart the spread of
communism in the United States, including producing a series of radio broadcasts
indicating the evils of communism and publicly supporting Senator Joseph
McCarthy's anti-communist activities from 1950-1953).
108. KAUFFMAN, supra note 98, at 123.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 124; see also Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 610.
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The legislative history of the Pledge's alteration is rife with refer-
ence to religion as the basis for the change, largely in connection with
the threat of communism in the United States. Committee reports and
floor debates demonstrate many of these references. As one report
stated
Our American Government is founded on the concept of the individu-
ality and the dignity of the human being. Underlying the concept is
the belief that the human person is important because he was created
by God and endowed by Him with certain inalienable rights ... [T~he
inclusion of God in our pledge therefore would further acknowledge
the dependence of our people and our Government upon the moral
directions of the Creator. At the same time it would serve to deny the
atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism ...."'
In a speech following the passage of the change, President Eisen-
hower also noted the importance of the religious content as he charac-
terized the change as "reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith
in America's heritage and future."'1 2
Unlike public prayers, the Pledge of Allegiance has rarely been
challenged in the courts or examined by legal scholars, until
recently." 3 Since its codification as the official Pledge, the Supreme
Court has ruled on its constitutionality in one clear instance with
regards to school children, although this was prior to the addition of
the "under God" language. In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, a resolution of the state board of education required all teach-
ers and students to say the Pledge of Allegiance each school day."
4
Those students who refused could face expulsion plus the government
could charge their parents, subjecting them to fines or even imprison-
ment." 5 Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson looked at the coer-
cive nature of requiring the Pledge recitation, indicating that the
school cannot force patriotism or nationalism on its students.
116 Jus-
tice Jackson noted
111. Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 610 (quoting H.R. Rep. No 83-1693 at 1-2(1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340).
112. See Gey, supra note 65, at 1878.
113. Hall, supra note 26, at 40.
114. 319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943). Prior to Barnette, the Supreme Court did rule on the
constitutionality of a city ordinance that compelled students to salute the flag. In
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobits, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the Court upheld the city
ordinance as constitutional, but this was prior to the passage of now codified 4. U.S.C.
§ 4, making the Pledge of Allegiance the official pledge and before the Establishment
Clause was incorporated to state government action in Everson.
115. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628.
116. Id. at 641-42.
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Authority here is to be controlled by the public opinion, not public
opinion by authority ... If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.1 17
Although this case involved the Pledge, it is important to note that
it did not involve voluntary pledges of allegiance nor did it concern
religious messages in the Pledge. Because the case dealt with forcing
political ideas and not religious ideas onto the students no Establish-
ment Clause analysis arose. Since the "under God" phrase had not
been added to the Pledge at the time of the Barnette decision, the case
provides an important resource for analysis, but was not binding pre-
cedent in the current controversy.
Another case directly on point, but from a lower court, stems from
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In Sherman v. Community Con-
sol. School Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 118 the Seventh Circuit was
called upon to answer the exact same questions as in the Newdow case.
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, however, the Seventh Circuit found that the
"under God" phrase of the Pledge did not violate the Constitution. 119
The Seventh Circuit did not resort to the Lemon test, or any test for that
matter. 20 The Seventh Circuit looked more at the history of religious
practices and concluded that the Pledge is a patriotic exercise in which
"whatever may have been their origins, no longer have a religious pur-
pose or meaning."'' Thus, the Seventh Circuit used a more general
ceremonial deism analysis to find that this practice, as dicta from
Supreme Court cases has stated, is not in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.' 2 2
III. FACTS OF NEWDOW
The Victim, Michael Newdow
Almost as controversial as the question of religion's place in soci-
ety is the respondent himself, Dr. Michael Newdow. Newdow not only
117. Id. at 641.
118. 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 445 (noting that at least four current justices have voted to eliminate and
one other expressed its doubts about the Lemon test, therefore the Circuit Court was
"not disposed to resolve the case by parsing Lemon.").
121. Id. at 447.
122. Id.
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holds a medical degree but also a law degree. 123 An avowed atheist,
Newdow brought the same complaint about the Pledge of Allegiance in
the state of Florida, but his case was summarily dismissed.' 24
Newdow has admitted that suing the government is somewhat of a
hobby,125 and admits that to him "[i]t's a cool thing to do. Everyone
should try it."'1 2
6
Newdow was criticized for merely grandstanding in his daughters'
name. Critics pointed to his original denial of being the child's father
and his lack of involvement in her life until the chance of suing the
government in her name arose. 127 Newdow made no regrets that this
was largely his cause. When asked at "what point did your daugh-
ter ...say she was ostracized for not saying the Pledge," Newdow
answered
123. Charles Lane, An Allegiance to Dissent, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 2, 2003, at A01.
124. See Newdow v. United States, 207 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2000)(affirming the
ruling for the Southern District of Florida, 98-06585-CIV-UUB without a published
opinion); see also, Chris Taylor, Talking with Michael Newdow, TIME, January 29, 2002.
The Pledge, however, is not Dr. Newdow's only line of assault on government action
and the Establishment Clause. Newdow also sued President George W. Bush, arguing
that the inclusion of a prayer during the 2001 presidential inauguration violated the
separation of church and state. As with his first case over the Pledge, Newdow's claim
was dismissed by the Federal District Court, a decision subsequently upheld by the
Court of Appeals, which found that Newdow lacked sufficient injury to bring an
action. See Newdow v. Bush, No. 02-16327, 89 Fed. Appx. 624, 2004 US APP LEXIS
3452 (9th Cir. 2004).
125. See Taylor supra note 124..
126. Litigant Explains Why He Brought Pledge Suit, TALKBACK LIVE (CNN television
Broadcast, June 26, 2002), available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/26/
Newdow.cnna.index.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2004). Among Newdow's other
"hobbies" include a desire to see "In God We Trust" removed from all currency and to
replace gender-based pronouns such as "he" and "she" with a gender-neutral pronoun
of his own creation, "ree." Taylor, supra note 124. He also has been selling a music
compact disc of his own singing and guitar playing to help finance his legal causes.
See Pledge of Allegiance Supreme Court Case, RELGION AND ETHICS NEWS WEEKLY, Feb.
27, 2004, available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/week7
2 6 /
cover.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
127. See Lane, supra note 123 at A01. In the article, Lane cites Newdow's
statements from court documents in the custody suit with the child's mother, Sandra
Banning. Lane notes that "He (Newdow) has asserted in court that the child was
conceived when Banning forced him to have sex during a trip to Yosemite National
Park." Banning also said that Newdow tried to keep the paternity a secret by
introducing them as "my friend Sandy and her daughter." Newdow has furnished
housing in California for Banning and their daughter, although he did evict Banning in
1999 after the two had an argument. Banning also noted that "each month his child-
support checks arrive with the notation 'Under Protest."'
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My daughter is in the lawsuit because you need that for standing. I
brought the case because I am an atheist and this offends me, and I
have the right to bring-up my daughter without God being imposed
into her life by her school teachers. So she did not come and say she
was ostracized.' 2 '
For his efforts, Newdow received death threats 129 and was criti-
cized by public officials. 130 On the other side, he has been held as a
hero to atheists' causes and regarded by some as the true champion of
the First Amendment. 13 1
Lower Court Holdings
Michael Newdow's current "hobby" against the government began
in the Eastern District of California. After a federal Magistrate Judge
recommended dismissal on May 25, 2000,132 the case was headed by
District Court Judge Edward J. Schwartz, who dismissed Newdow's
complaint. 133  Newdow appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which filed the opinion of the three judge panel on June 26,
2002 (Newdow I). 13 4 However, this original opinion was later modified
by the Ninth Circuit (Newdow II). 131
Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, a Nixon appointee, 136 wrote the major-
ity opinion and was joined by Judge Stephen Reinhardt. 13' Both opin-
ions established that Newdow had standing to bring the suit under
"his right to direct the religious education of his daughter."' 138
Although the Ninth Circuit originally ruled on the constitutionality of
the 1954 Act of Congress that added the phrase "under God,' 3 9 in the
amended opinion, the majority limited its analysis to the school's
action of administering the Pledge and withdrew the issue of the con-
128. TALKBACK LIVE, supra note 126.
129. See Jessica Reaves, Person of the Week: Michael Newdow, TIME, June 28, 2002.
130. See Lane, supra note 123, at A01 (quoting Federal Court of Appeals Judge,
Dairmund O'Scannlain who said Newdow was "seeking a right to be fastidiously self-
indulgent and intolerant.").
131. See http://atheists.org/action/newdowpetition.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
132. See Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 601.
133. See id.
134. Newdow I, 292 F3d 597.
135. Newdow II, 328 F.3d 466.
136. See Reaves, supra note 129.
137. See Newdow II, 328 F.3d 466; Newdow I, 292 F.3d 597.
138. Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 602; Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 485.
139. Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 602 (stating "[a]lthough the district court lacksjurisdiction over the President and the Congress [due to separation of federal powers],
the question of the constitutionality of the 1954 Act remains before us.").
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stitutionality of the 1954 Act.1 40 This effectively limited the holding of
the Ninth Circuit in that it would have only excluded the Pledge from
school recitations, but would have left the Pledge open for use at other
public ceremonies. The Newdow I ruling may have brought into ques-
tion the use of the Pledge in any public ceremony since the Ninth Cir-
cuit found the Pledge as rewritten by the 1954 Act was
unconstitutional, rather than finding the mere use of the Pledge in one
instance unconstitutional, as it did in Newdow II.
The amended opinion was further watered-down by the Establish-
ment Clause analysis utilized in Newdow II. In Newdow I, the court
determined that three tests had been used by the Supreme Court, the
Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test, and that in
Santa Fe v. Independent School District, the Supreme Court employed
all three. 14 ' The court stated it was "free to apply any or all of the three
tests, and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of them."'1 42 The
opinion examined the Pledge under all three tests and found that it
failed each one. 143 The circuit court held that the Pledge failed the
first prong of the Lemon test, in that it lacked secular purpose, based
on the legislative history of the 1954 change. 144 The Ninth Circuit
further held that the Pledge failed both the endorsement 145 and coer-
cion tests.'
46
140. Newdow II 328 F.3d at 490 (stating "[i]n addition to the relief that Newdow
seeks against the school district- relief to which he is entitled-Newdow seeks a
declaration as to the constitutionality of the 1954 Act. The district court did not
discuss that question because it dismissed Newdow's complaint on the basis of its
holding that the school district's policy did not violate the First Amendment. Given
our contrary holding, we must consider whether to grant Newdow's claim for
declaratory relief as to the Act. Normally, whether to decide a claim for declaratory
judgment is left to the discretion of the district court ... We doubt that, given the relief
to which we decide Newdow is entitled, the district court would have exercised its
discretionary power to resolve, in the present case, the additional issue as to which
Newdow seeks declaratory relief. Accordingly, we decline to reach that issue here."
(citations omitted)).
141. Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 605-07; see also Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
142. Id. at 607.
143. Id. at 607-11.
144. Id. at 610 (finding that the legislative history "reveals that the purpose of the
1954 Act was to take a position on the question of theism, namely, to support the
existence and moral authority of God.").
145. Id. at 608 (stating the recitation of the Pledge is "conveying a message of state
endorsement of a religious belief.").
146. Id. at 608-09 (finding that the Pledge "placels] students in the untenable
position of choosing between participating in an exercise with religious content or
protesting"). The Ninth Circuit relied on Lee v. Weisman (see note 74, supra, and
accompanying text for discussion) and used similar language as it surmised that "the
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While Newdow I struck down the Pledge under three different
Establishment Clause tests, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Newdow II
struck down the school's practice of reciting the Pledge based only on
the coercion test.' 4 7 Much of the discussion about the Pledge signal-
ing the endorsement of religion, including the alienation of unbeliev-
ers, was included in Newdow II, but only in a footnote.' 48 Newdow II
did retain the analysis of the legislative history of the 1954 Act, 1 4 9 and
reiterated that this opinion respects seemingly contrary Supreme
Court dicta concerning the Pledge. 150 Aside from the changes, both
opinions attempted to separate the Pledge from other language that
may be considered ceremonial deism. The Ninth Circuit made clear
that in its view
The recitation that ours is a nation "under God" is not a mere acknowl-
edgement that many Americans believe in a deity. Nor is it merely
descriptive of the undeniable historical significance of religion in the
founding of the Republic . . . To recite the Pledge is not to describe the
United States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the values for which
the flag stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and - since 1954 -
monotheism. 151
Judge Ferdinand Fernandez dissented as to the Establishment
Clause violation.'1 2  In the dissenting opinion, Judge Fernandez
appealed to the "neutrality" test, in that the Establishment Clause
requires a government not to discriminate for or against a religion.15 3
Judge Fernandez also argued that the danger or threat that the Pledge
"will tend to bring about a theocracy or suppress somebody's beliefs is
so minuscule as to be de minimis. The danger that phrase presents to
our First Amendment freedoms is picayune at most.' 5 4 His opinion
'subtle and indirect' social pressure which permeates the classroom also renders more
acute the message sent to non- believing schoolchildren that the are outsiders."
147. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 487 (holding "[w]e are free to apply any or all of the
three tests [Lemon, endorsement, or coercion] and to invalidate any measure that fails
any one of them. Because we conclude that the school district policy impermissibly
coerces a religious act and accordingly hold the policy unconstitutional, we need not
consider whether the policy fails the endorsement test or the Lemon test as well.").
148. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 488 n.5.
149. Id. at 488.
150. Id. at 489. This information was included as a footnote in Newdow I, 292 F.3d
at 611 n.12.
151. Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 608; Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 489.
152. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 490 (Fernandez, J., concurring and
dissenting)(concurring with the jurisdiction and standing issues, but disagreeing as to
the constitutional violation).
153. Id. at 491 (Fernandez, J., concurring and dissenting).
154. Id. (Fernandez, J., concurring and dissenting).
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also cited thirteen members of the Supreme Court, including five cur-
rent members, as having stated that such a slight danger is not a viola-
tion of the Constitution. 155 Judge Fernandez also predicted the litany
of other claims that may arise due to the Ninth Circuit's current
decision. 15
6
Although not on the three-judge Newdow I or II panel, Judge
O'Scannlain wrote a scathing dissenting opinion from the denial of
hearing the case en banc.157 O'Scannlain, thought to be one of the
most conservative members of the Ninth Circuit,158 called the opinion
"wrong, very wrong -wrong because reciting the Pledge of Allegiance is
simply not a 'religious act' . . . wrong as a mater of Supreme Court
precedent properly understood, wrong because it set up a direct con-
flict with the law of another circuit, and wrong as matter of common
sense."' 59 Judge O'Scannlain examined Supreme Court rulings such
as Engle, Schempp, Wallace, and Lee to determine that only formal
religious exercises are unconstitutional 160 and that "patriotic invoca-
tions of God simply have no tendency to establish state religion."161
The Ninth Circuit's decision created a storm of interest and con-
troversy. 162 Soon after the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the United States
Senate displayed their support for the "under God" wording, voting
155. Id. at n.3 (Fernandez, J., concurring and dissenting).
156. Id. at 492-93 (Fernandez, J., concurring and dissenting)(stating "we will soon
find ourselves prohibited from using our album of patriotic songs in many public
settings. "God Bless America" and "America The Beautiful" will be gone for sure....
And currency beware! Judges can accept those results if they limit themselves to
elements and tests, while failing to look at the good sense and principles that animated
those tests in the first place .... [Striking down these practices] will cool the febrile
nerves of a few at the cost of removing the healthy glow conferred upon the many
citizens when the forbidden verses, or phrases, are uttered, read, or seen.").
157. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 471 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of en banc
hearing).
158. See Erwin Chemerinky, The Myth of The Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 Loy. LA L.
REv 1, 2 (2003).
159. Newdow I, 328 F.3d at 472 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 478 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 481 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
162. One measure of the controversy may be seen by the high number of amicus
briefs filed with the Supreme Court that may increase the chances of the Court
granting certiorari in a case. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized
Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109-
1127 (1988). A total of fifty amicus briefs were filed with the Court, twenty-nine in
support of the Pledge's constitutionality and twenty-one in support of Newdow. See
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supremecourt/docket/2003/march.html.
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ninety-nine to zero in favor of the phrase. 163 Other public officials
likewise stated their opposition to the Ninth Circuit's ruling, including
six federal judges' 64 and President George W. Bush, who called the
decisions "ridiculous."'
16 5
IV. NEWDOW'S DAY IN THE SUPREME COURT
Initial Rulings
Two interesting procedural issues added to the unusual storyline
of the Newdow case. First, Justice Scalia, thought to be one of the most
accomodationist Justices currently on the Court, based on his prior
opinions, recused himself from participation. 166 In an interesting
twist, the Knights of Columbus came back into play concerning the
Pledge, fifty years after they originally lobbied Congress to add the
"under God" phrasing. It was at a Knights of Columbus rally where
Justice Scalia, a guest speaker, made negative statements concerning
the Ninth Circuit's Newdow I decision. 167 These statements induced
Michael Newdow to file a motion for Scalia's recusal.168 Scalia agreed
to recuse himself from the case, 169 removing one of the most tolerant
Justices of the government endorsement of religion 170 and opening the
possibility of an evenly divided Court.
Another procedural issue that the Court was required to address
was whether to allow Newdow to represent himself at oral arguments.
Generally, an attorney must have been admitted to practice law in
some jurisdiction for at least three years before they can argue before
the Supreme Court.17 1 Although a law school graduate, Newdow has
163. Richard Willing, Supreme Court to Consider Pledge, USA TODAY, October 14,
2003.
164. Id.
165. See Reaves, supra note 129.
166. See Tony Mauro, Scalia'sRecusal in Pledge Case May Open New Front in Growing
Debate on What Judges Should and Should Not Say Off the Bench, NEW JERSEY LAW
JOURNAL, October 20, 2003.
167. See Respondent's Suggestion For Recusal of Justice Scalia at 3, Newdow III (No.
02-1624).
168. Id. Interestingly, Newdow used Scalia's own language from an opinion
concerning recusals in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), as support for his
argument that Scalia should not participate. Id. at 4.
169. Court to Hear Pledge Case on March 24, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, Jan. 12,
2004.
170. Yannella, supra note 65, at 91.
171. Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Part II, Rule 5-1 (1999).
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never actually practiced law. 1 7 2 However, the Court did issue an order
allowing Michael Newdow to represent himself pro se.
1 73
Arguments for Each Side: the Briefs
Both the school and Newdow filed written briefs with the
Supreme Court examining the arguments in support of each side. Elk
Grove first argued that Newdow lacked standing to bring the case
because, not having legal custody over his daughter, he does not have
the right under California law to direct the child's welfare, education,
or religious upbringing, and thus Newdow has not suffered an
injury. 174 Next, the school argued several grounds for ruling that the
Pledge as conducted was not a violation of the Constitution. First, Elk
Grove argued that in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
the Supreme Court ruled that a state cannot compel a student to take
the Pledge, but that voluntary recitation is not coercive. 175 Second,
mirroring prior language used for ceremonial deism, the school argued
that, looking at our nation's history, this was a patriotic act and not a
religious act.'76 Third, Elk Grove argued, citing Marsh v. Chambers,
the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that the Supreme Court is not
limited by the three Establishment Clause tests, but rather the Court
can apply a flexible test, taking into consideration the history of the
practice. 177 Under the more flexible test, Elk Grove claimed the Pledge
did not violate the Establishment Clause, as it is shown to be part of
the "fabric of our society." 178
Michael Newdow's arguments mirrored the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit opinion. Newdow argued that the Pledge violated every Estab-
lishment Clause test, was more than a mere acknowledgement of the
founding of the nation, and that it perpetuated prejudices suffered by
atheists. 179 He also asserted that the Pledge affected his ability to edu-
cate his child in the way he saw fit. 180 Concluding his brief, Newdow
argued that "rather than being 'one nation indivisible,' America is now
divided on the basis of religion by its very own 'symbol."" 8
172. See ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSwAIRE, supra note 169.
173. Elk Grove United Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 860 (2003)(issuing an order
allowing Newdow to represent himself).
174. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 19, Newdow III (No. 02-1624).
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id. at 30.
177. Id. at 41.
178. Id. at 34.
179. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 8, 9, 12, 15, Newdow III (No. 02-1624).
180. Id. at 24.
181. Id. at 50.
2004]
25
Collins: Lost in the Forest of the Establishment Clause: Elk Grove v. Newd
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2004
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Oral Argument
Oral arguments occurred on March 24, 2004. Much of both par-
ties' time before the Court was devoted to standing, predicting the pos-
sibility that the Court would not reach the merits.182 Petitioners
argued that Newdow lacked standing to bring the case and that the
Pledge is a "patriotic exercise that is part of an unbroken history of
official government acknowledgment of the role of religion in Ameri-
can life."'1 83 Similar to Judge Fernandez at the circuit court level, the
petitioners noted that fourteen Justices had indicated, at least in dicta,
that the Pledge was not a religious exercise and that there was a differ-
ence between "purely religious exercise . . . and the ceremonial refer-
ence in solemn public occasions." 18 4 Elk Grove attempted to persuade
the Court that the "under God" language is merely "an acknowledg-
ment of the religious basis of the framers."' 85  The petitioners
attempted to undermine the 1954 legislative history, which seemed to
show religious intent, with legislative history of 2002, at which time
Congress reaffirmed the importance of the Pledge as a patriotic, not
religious, exercise.' 86 Overall, the petitioners faced few tough ques-
tions, seeming to get several "softball" questions that they answered in
their Brief and that they were clearly prepared to answer. 18 7
Newdow appeared to face more difficult questions. As for the con-
stitutional argument, he tried to downplay the fact that the child can
refuse to repeat the Pledge.' 8 8 He began to make an analogy to Lee v.
Weisman, where the Court held coercion existed even when one did
not have to participate. 8 9 Cutting him off abruptly, Justice O'Connor
noted, "That was a prayer," at which time Newdow replied that the
182. The majority text of sixteen of the fifty-three substantive pages of the written
transcript were devoted to the issue of standing.
183. Oral Argument Transcript at 3, Newdow III (No. 02-1624).
184. Id. at 16.
185. Id. at 19.
186. Id. at 19-20. Justice Ginsburg asked the Elk Grove if there is a stronger case for
the constitutionality of the Pledge today than fifty years ago, and Elk Grove argued that
there was a stronger case today, because "under God" is only a "descriptive phrase."
Id. at 21.
187. See id. at 18. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist asked why the Pledge was
not a "prayer or not an exercise," a question that should have clearly been anticipated
by the Petitioners and was detailed in their Brief.
188. Id. at 27.
189. Id: Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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Establishment Clause did not require there to be a prayer.190 The
Chief Justice questioned Newdow repeatedly about why the Pledge is
not merely descriptive. 191 The Respondent argued that it is not the
government's role to put the idea of "God" into the mind of his child
and that it interfered with his "absolute right to raise my child as
whatever I see fit."'1 9 2 At that point, Justice Ginsburg returned to the
standing argument by stating, "No, you don't, you don't .... [Tihere is
another custodian of this child who makes the final decision who
doesn't agree with you." Thus, again signifying the trouble that several
Justices appeared to have with Newdow's standing.
193
Newdow was also asked about other references to God, such as on
coins and the opening of the Court. He answered that those would not
violate the Establishment Clause as long as no one is required or
coerced into affirming those beliefs. 194 Justice Breyer also raised the
issue that the terms used were so broad and generic that it may lack a
religious tone and really be inclusive of everyone, using the language of
ceremonial deism. 195 Newdow answered by saying, "I don't think that
I can include under God to mean no God, which is exactly what I
think."'1
9 6
There was some indication thatJustice Souter may have been lean-
ing toward Newdow's side when the Justice said:
I will assume, and I - - I do assume, that - - that if you read the pledge
carefully, the - the reference to under God means something more than
a mere description of how somebody else once thought. We're pledg-
ing allegiance to the flag and to the republic. The republic is then
described as being under God, and I think a fair reading of that would -
-would be I think that's the way the republic ought to be conceived, as
under God. So I think - - I think there's some affirmation there. I will
grant you that. 1 9
7
But even Justice Souter seemed to indicate that the phrasing was
just ceremonial deism, or that the religious nature is "so tepid, so
diluted" that it is constitutionally permissible. 198 However, just as
190. Oral Argument Transcript at 27, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). Newdow
attempted to analogize to Lee again and Justice O'Connor pointed out that the two
cases are distinguishable since Lee involved prayer. Id. at 33.
191. Id. at 28-29.
192. Id. at 31.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 32.
195. Id. at 34-36.
196. Id. at 36.
197. Id. at 38-39.
198. Id. at 39.
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with the Chief Justice's question to the Petitioner, Souter had to know
that the Respondent was prepared to answer this question, so Justice
Souter may have been giving Newdow the opportunity to answer a
question he clearly should have been prepared to answer. Yet, the
other justices, especially the Chief Justice, continually raised the
notion that the Pledge is not a prayer, is said in a ceremonial context,
and has a long history of usage, indicating an acceptance of ceremo-
nial deism. 199
A Flag Day Surprise: Elk Grove v. Newdow Decided
Fittingly, on Flag Day, June 14, 2004, the Supreme Court released
the opinion for Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.2 °° In
reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, a five-member majority avoided
the constitutional question by finding that Michael Newdow lacked
standing, either as a "next friend" or on his own, to raise his claims
since his legal rights as the child's father were uncertain.2 °1 Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, decided:
In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by
a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that
are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse
effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiffs claimed stand-
ing. When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the
outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand
rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitu-
tional law .... We conclude that, having been deprived under Califor-
nia law of the right to sue as next friend, Newdow lacks prudential
standing to bring this suit in federal court.2 0 2
The majority opinion did not discuss the Establishment Clause in
any respect, but limited itself to an examination of standing and the
importance "for the federal courts to leave delicate issues of domestic
relations to the state courts. ' 20 3 Thus, even though the father had
"joint legal custody" and the father possessed the ability to provide
input and influence over his child's religious upbringing,20 4 the fact
199. See id. at 40-42.
200. 124 S. Ct. 2301.
201. Id. at 2312.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2309.
204. Id. at 2311 (finding that the California "cases create a zone of private authority
within which each parent, whether custodial or noncustodial, remains free to impart to
the child his or her religious perspective.") (citing In Re Marriage of Mentry, 142 Cal.
App. 3d 260, 267-268 (1983)).
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that someone other than the father had "a form of veto power '20 5 over
all decisions concerning the child negated the father's standing.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas
concurred with the outcome of reversing the Ninth Circuit, but all
would have done so on the merits of the constitutional claim. The
Chief Justice noted that the Supreme Court had produced a "novel pru-
dential standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits of the
constitutional claim," and provided his detailed reasoning why
Michael Newdow possessed standing.20 6 Justice O'Connor and Justice
Thomas agreed with the Chief Justice as to standing, but focused their
opinions on the constitutional issue.
As to the constitutional issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the
many references to God in the Nation's past, such as the national
Thanksgiving Day holiday and various religious references in presiden-
tial speeches. 20 7 In finding the Pledge constitutionally permissible,
the Chief Justice distinguished the recitation of the Pledge from the
prayer at issue in Lee v. Weisman.20  Rehnquist also appealed to the
majoritarian process of the government system. Thus, we have three
levels of popular government-the national, the state, and the local-
collaborating to produce the Elk Grove ceremony. The Constitution
only requires that schoolchildren be entitled to abstain from the cere-
mony if they chose to do so. To give the parent of such a child a sort of
"heckler's veto" over a patriotic ceremony willingly participated in by
other students, simply because the Pledge of Allegiance contains the
descriptive phrase "under God," is an unwarranted extension of the
Establishment Clause, an extension which would have the unfortunate
effect of prohibiting a commendable patriotic observance.20 9
Justice O'Connor wrote perhaps the most direct opinion that
would add some clarity to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Her
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2312 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)(finding "[w]hile she is intimately
associated with the source of respondent's standing (the father-daughter relationship
and respondent's rights thereunder), the daughter is not the source of respondent's
standing; instead it is their relationship that provides respondent his standing, which
is clear once respondent's interest is properly described."). Id. at 2316.
207. Id. at 2317-319 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 2319 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)("I do not believe that the phrase 'under
God' in the Pledge converts its recital into a 'religious exercise' of the sort described in
Lee. Instead, it is a declaration of belief in allegiance and loyalty to the United States
flag and the Republic that it represents .... Reciting the Pledge, or listening to others
recite it, is a patriotic exercise, not a religious one; participants promise fidelity to our
flag and our Nation, not to any particular God, faith, or church.").
209. Id. at 2320 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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opinion, if accepted by a majority of the Court, would uphold the
Pledge based on the endorsement test and establish a constitutional
exception for references that can be defined as ceremonial deism. 210
However, even Justice O'Connor would not limit all Establishment
Clause analyses to the endorsement test, but rather noted that the
Court must employ different tests in different situations.2 1' She came
to the conclusion that when government-sponsored speech or displays
are challenged, the endorsement test "captures the essential command
of the Establishment Clause. 2 12
Justice O'Connor described four factors that should be used to
define something as ceremonial deism, making it constitutionally per-
missible. She began by commenting on the importance of religion in
the nation's founding and history and as an important patriotic exer-
cise.213 She noted the phrase or practice must be longstanding and
regularly practiced throughout the country. Although no set time limit
was given, apparently fifty years (the time since "under God" was
added to the Pledge and practiced by "millions of children" with rela-
tively little objection) appears to satisfy this prong of the ceremonial
deism test.2 1
4
A second factor to be defined as ceremonial deism requires that
the phrase or act not be prayer or worship. Justice O'Connor noted
that this factor must be based on the standard of a reasonable observer
who is fully aware of the history of the phrase or act. 21 5 The Pledge
meets this requirement because it is merely descriptive, it is conducted
by teachers, not religious leaders, and even though the legislative his-
tory shows a non-secular purpose for adding "under God," "[alny relig-
ious freight the words may have been meant to carry originally has
long since been lost. '2 16
The third factor is that the phrase or act must not reference any
particular religion. Here, Justice O'Connor turns an argument used by
the circuit court on its head. While the Ninth Circuit found that the
phrase "under God" was just as constitutionally offensive as "under
210. Id. at 2323.
211. Id. at 2321 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring)(quoting Cty of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S.
573, 627 (1989)).
213. See id. at 2323-324 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 2324 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(noting that over the fifty-year period,
with so many school children reciting the Pledge, there had only been three reported
challenges)(citations omitted).
215. Id. at 2321-322 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 2325 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Jesus" or "under Vishnu," '17 Justice O'Connor used the exact same lan-
guage to distinguish "under God" as permissible since it "represents a
tolerable attempt to acknowledge religion and to invoke its solem-
nizing power without favoring any individual religious sect or belief
system.
2 18
The final requirement is that the phrase or act must have only
minimal religious content.219 This factor may be satisfied when the
reference to religion is very brief or it is not an essential part of the
entire exercise or statement.22 ° Justice O'Connor explained that while
she limited her analysis to the endorsement test, properly identified
instances of ceremonial deism would likewise survive constitutional
scrutiny under the coercion test as well.221
Justice Thomas authored perhaps the most radical concurring
opinion, suggesting the overturn of Lee v. Weisman and that the Estab-
lishment Clause created no individual rights at all.222 Justice Thomas
began his analysis by showing how under the Lee analysis the Pledge
could not pass the coercion test, giving credence to Newdow's argu-
ments and to the Ninth Circuit's opinion.223 Thomas suggested that
finding the Pledge not coercive in this instance would be inconsistent
with the prior holding in Barnette, which held that the required Pledge
did coerce an affirmation of belief.224 Thomas then laid out his analy-
sis of why the Establishment Clause was not intended to be applied to
individual state actions. Looking at history, he noted that the purpose
of the Establishment Clause was to prohibit the federal government
217. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 487.
218. Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
219. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
220. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
221. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
222. See id. at 2327 (Thomas, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 2328 (Thomas, J., concurring)("Adherence to Lee would require us to
strike down the Pledge policy, which, in most respects, poses more serious difficulties
than the prayer at issue in Lee. A prayer at graduation is a one-time event, the
graduating students are almost (if not already) adults, and their parents are usually
present. By contrast, very young students, removed from the protection of their
parents, are exposed to the Pledge each and every day.").
224. Id. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring)("It is difficult to see how [the Pledge of
Allegiance] does not entail an affirmation that God exists ... IT]he Court has squarely
held that the government cannot require a person to 'declare his belief in God' . . . I
conclude that, as a matter of our precedent, the Pledge policy is unconstitutional.")
(citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961)).
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from creating a national religion, a protection that was intended to
benefit state governments, not individuals.225
However, his opinion went further to state that, even if the Estab-
lishment Clause did protect an individual's right against a state gov-
ernment action, the requirement of the Pledge is not coercive. He
explained that this stems from a false definition of "coercion" as
applied in Lee.226 In his view, coercion requires a threat of legal pen-
alty, not just peer pressure.227 Without this "actual legal coercion,"
Justice Thomas would hold that the voluntary Pledge of Allegiance
conducted at the school was constitutional.228
V. THE "LESSONS" OF NEWDow III?
With this information as background, one has to ask, "Did our
understanding of Establishment Clause jurisprudence grow through
the Pledge of Allegiance controversy?" It was clear from the oral argu-
ments that Dr. Newdow did not appear to have many allies on the
Bench. Given the Court's continual references to the ceremonial
nature of the pledge, questions about his standing even from more lib-
eral members of the Court, and the repeated references that the Pledge
is not prayer, it was not difficult to determine that the Ninth Circuit
opinion would be overturned. However, the grounds upon which the
Supreme Court selected to overturn that decision did nothing to settle
the constitutional issue at hand, nor did it provide guidance in this
murky area of law.
With all the uproar on both sides of the debate concerning the
Pledge of Allegiance, the Court's Newdow opinion did nothing more
than maintain the status quo. Just as before, schools are free to allow
voluntary recitations of the Pledge. Those opposed to the "under God"
language are free to say that it is unconstitutional, since the Court
stopped short of addressing the issue. Clearly, the Supreme Court's
avoidance of the constitutional question will do little to quell or pacify
the parties on either side of the dispute. Likewise, it gives little gui-
dance to lower courts who will be forced to address similar claims.
The Supreme Court, or rather all the actors that must follow precedent,
including attorneys, school boards, legislatures, and lower court
judges, lost the opportunity to clarify an area of law that has been
225. See id. at 2331 (noting that if incorporated against the states, the Establishment
Clause would "prohibits exactly what the Establishment Clause protected - state
practices that pertain to 'an establishment of religion."').
226. See id. at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring).
227. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring)(citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
228. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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unclear for decades. This point is further magnified given the Supreme
Court norm of accepting and deciding cases in order to resolve con-
flicts among the circuit courts.229
Yet, some constitutional guidance concerning the Pledge and cere-
monial deism may be deciphered from this case. Four justices cur-
rently appear to support the constitutionality of voluntary school
recitations of the Pledge on ceremonial deism grounds. The Chief Jus-
tice and Justices Thomas and O'Connor indicated their support for the
constitutionality of the Pledge through their concurring opinions in
Newdow III. Justice Scalia, who recused himself in the current case but
presumably would participate in future cases, would doubtlessly join
the Chief Justice, Thomas, and O'Connor based on his statements at
the Knights of Columbus rally and his past voting record in similar
cases.230 These four would need to add one more justice to form the
five-member voting bloc needed to create binding majority precedent.
Of the five remaining Justices, one may speculate about the possi-
ble fifth member that may in the future vote to support the constitu-
tionality of the Pledge. Possibly more importantly, some guidance may
be found as to which member may utilize ceremonial deism or join
Justice O'Connor in her creation of a constitutional exception for such
activities. To examine this point, one may look to the opinions written
by the Justices to determine their dispositions on this issue and by
exploring voting coalitions or how often a group of Justices will join
together on the outcomes of cases. These voting blocs may assist in
displaying like preferences on the Court and predicting possible future
cases.
23 1
A survey of twelve Establishment Clause and First Amendment
cases during the current Court's membership may provide some clues
as to the language used by Justices in authoring opinions and as to
possible voting groups.2 3 2 The voting blocs that stem from these case
229. See H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE 248-250 (1991).
230. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(stating that a prayer at a
graduation ceremony is not coercive). Clearly, if Scalia would not find a prayer as
coercing religion, the more informal inclusion of religion in the phrase "under God"
would not pose a problem for him.
231. See JEFFREY SEGAL AND HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATriTUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 388, 394-404 (2002).
232. These cases, found using a LEXIS key word search and from other sources,
include: Newdow III, Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct 2276 (2004), Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct.
1307 (2004), Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001), Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), Santa
Fe Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217
(2000), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
20041
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outcomes fall neatly into two groups, signified by those that most
often vote with the two most senior members of the current Court: the
Chief Justice Rehnquist group and the Justice Stevens group.233 These
groupings, and the language used by the authors, may indicate general
trends or at least determine which Justice may emerge as influential in
future cases.234
Justice Stevens would be an unlikely addition to the voting bloc
given his prior voting history and his favoring a strong separation of
church and state.235 He also authored the Santa Fe opinion, finding
(1997), Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), and
Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). Most of these
cases were directly decided on Establishment Clause grounds. In Southworth, the
Supreme Court did not conduct a tradition Establishment Clause analysis, the
decision relied heavily on the Rosenberger decision. Both cases dealt with university
funding of student speech. While Rosenberger involved the funding of a religious
student paper, Southworth did not directly involve religious speech. However, since the
Court utilized a similar analysis in each, Southworth is included because it is clear the
Court most likely would have taken the same approach if religious speech was
involved in both cases.
233. In these twelve cases, the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens agreed on the
outcome only three times, or 25% of the time. In the Rehnquist group, the Chief
Justice joined in the outcomes with Justice O'Connor nine times (75%), Justice Scalia
ten times (83%), Justice Kennedy ten times (83%), and Justice Thomas eleven times(92%). In the Justice Stevens group, Stevens joined in the outcomes with Justices
Souter ten times (83%), Ginsberg twelve times (100%), and Justice Breyer eight times
(67%).
234. While twelve cases indeed encompass a small sample to locate voting blocs, an
examination of the outcomes in this fashion, if anything, over estimates the
cohesiveness of the Supreme Court as a whole and may underestimate the distinction
between the Justices' voting blocs. For example, in Southworth, all nine Justices agreed
that a university's policy of assessing student activity fees, that would be used to
support student speech activities, was permissible. However, the Justices disagreed as
to the reasoning, with the majority, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, applying a "viewpoint neutrality
test." Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233. Concurring in the result, Justice Souter, joined by
Justices Stevens and Breyer, agreed that the policy was permissible, but would not set
such an overarching rule as would the majority. Id. at 236. While the outcome in
Southworth appears to show consistency across the Court, the question of what First
Amendment test to use in this and future cases was in dispute. This factor, of over-
estimating cohesiveness, may actually increase the implications of low voting
cohesion, such as between Justice Stevens and Justices Scalia who only joined in the
outcome of two cases or Justice Ginsburg and the Chief Justice who only joined
together in three case outcomes. Thus, this analysis may be more useful as a tool to
show who does not vote together rather than who does votes together.
235. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Zelman, the Court
ruled on a constitutional challenge to tuition vouchers provided by Ohio that were
subsequently used at religious private schools. Along voting blocs that may be similar
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that pre-game student-lead prayers at school football games "encour-
ages divisiveness along religious lines"' 23 6 and "has the improper effect
of coercing those present," even though attendance at the games is
"purely voluntary. 237 Justice Souter is also an unlikely candidate
given his voting record.238 One example may stem from Justice Sou-
ter's adamant opposition to public funding for religious schools, even
when a majority of the Court has allowed the funding on neutrality
grounds.239 These past actions, along with his somewhat favorable
comments and questions to Newdow at oral argument, make it highly
unlikely that he would support the constitutionality of the Pledge in a
future case.
to future ceremonial deism challenges, the Court, including the Chief Justice and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, upheld the vouchers on a neutrality
test. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. In this dissent, Justice
Stevens commented on the importance of remembering the religious conflict that can
occur within a society and noted that, "[w]henever we remove a brick from the wall
that was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the risk of
religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy." See also Greenawalt,
supra note 18, at 328.
236. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 311.
237. Id. at 312. Justice Stevens has also consistently disfavored any government
support for religious symbols. He dissented with the Court's holding that holiday
displays were constitutional in Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 654-655 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), and in Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S.
at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Capital Square, the Court struck down a city's
denial of granting a permit to the Klu Klux Klan to place a cross on public property. In
dissent, Stevens noted, "A paramount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to
protect such a person from being made to feel like an outsider in matters of faith, and
a stranger in the political community. If a reasonable person could perceive a
government endorsement of religion from a private display, then the State may not
allow its property to be used as a forum for that display. No less stringent rule can
adequately protect non-adherence from a well-grounded perception that their
sovereign supports a faith to which they do not subscribe. . . .[The Establishment
Clause] proscribes state action supporting the establishment of a number of religions
as well as the official endorsement of religion in preference to nonreligion." Capital
Square, 515 U.S. at 799-800, 809 (Stevens, J., dissenting). From these statements, it is
clear that the tenets of ceremonial deism, such as neutrality and secular purposes,
would not be supported by Justice Stevens.
238. Justice Souter joined with Justice Rehnquist in the outcome of these cases only
three times, or 25% of the time, Justices Scalia and Thomas only twice (17%), and
Justice O'Connor six times (50%).
239. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686-717 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S.
at 867-913 (Souter, J., dissenting); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 240-260 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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Justice Breyer also appears an unlikely candidate to join the con-
servative voting bloc on the ceremonial deism issue. 240 He also dis-
sented in Zelman with strong language recognizing the need for the
separation of church and state and rejecting neutrality in government
aid to religion.2 4' Justice Ginsburg is also unlikely to join a majority
supporting ceremonial deism, given her alignment with the more lib-
eral members of the Court in this issue,242 although she twice joined
the more conservative group on the outcome of a case, over the dissent
of the more liberal bloc.2 43
Out of the five Justices who voted to avoid the constitutional issue,
Justice Kennedy would appear the best possible choice to join the more
conservative bloc. Often thought of as an important "swing vote"
along with Justice O'Connor, 44 he also has voted consistently with the
more conservative members of the Court in this area.245 However, Jus-
tice Kennedy authored the opinion in Lee v. Weisman, striking down
graduation prayers based on the indirect coercive effects.2 46 As noted
in Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Newdow Ill, it would be dif-
ficult for Justice Kennedy to agree that the Pledge is not coercive, given
the wide definition of coercion he penned in Lee. His decisions reflect
that the importance for Justice Kennedy may be the setting of the
240. Justice Breyer joined with the Chief Justice as to the outcome of cases five times(42%), with Justices Scalia and Thomas four times (33%), and with Justice O'Connor
eight times (67%).
241. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 728-729 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[The Supreme Court]
adopts, under the name of 'neutrality,' an interpretation of the Establishment Clause
that this Court rejected more than half a century ago .... An earlier Court found that
'equal opportunity' principle insufficient; it read the Clause as insisting upon greater
separation of church and state, at least in respect to primary education .... In a
society composed of many different religious creeds, I fear that this present departure
from the Court's earlier understanding risks creating a form of religiously based
conflict potentially harmful to the Nation's social fabric .. " (citations omitted)). But
see Good News Club v. Milford Cent Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001), whereJustice Breyer didjoin the more conservative group as to the outcome of the case.
242. Justice Ginsberg joined Justice Stevens twelve times (100%), Justice Souter ten
times (8 3 %), and Justice Breyer eight times (67%).
243. See Southworth, 529 U.S. 217; Flores, 521 U.S. 507. Overall, however, Justice
Ginsberg joined with the Chief Justice as to the outcome of these cases three times(25%), joined Justice O'Connor four times (33%), and Justices Scalia and Thomas only
two times (17%).
244. See Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 360.
245. Justice Kennedy joined with the Chief Justice as to outcome in ten cases (83%),
and with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas nine times (75%), with Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg five times (42%), and Justice Breyer seven times (58%).
246. 505 U.S. at 588.
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action. 247 Thus, it appears that Justice Kennedy may be the compass
that guides future decisions through this area. If future litigants can
sway Justice Kennedy that their practices are constitutionally accept-
able, they are likely to win in the Supreme Court.24 8 Further, as circuit
court judges and state supreme court judges formulate and write their
opinions, they may strategically focus on Justice Kennedy's past opin-
ions in this area to sway his vote.249 On issues of ceremonial deism,
future actors may pay heed to Justice Kennedy's opinion in Allegheny v.
ACLU, where he appears supportive of ceremonial deism, at least in
some instances.25 °
More important than the Pledge itself, the Court's future treat-
ment of ceremonial deism could have more wide-ranging effects on the
daily lives of individuals. If the Court were to adopt Justice
O'Connor's view that acts of ceremonial deism are exceptions to the
Establishment Clause, many more instances of government action
could fall under this rubric and therefore be constitutionally permissi-
ble. Things such as the singing of patriotic songs, including "God
Bless America" or the National Motto, could potentially be effected by
how the Supreme Court treats future challenges to the Pledge. With
five Justices, including Justice Kennedy, appearing to support ceremo-
nial deism in some respect, it is clear from Newdow that, given the right
set of facts, a majority of the Court could in the near future officially
recognize ceremonial deism as either an exception to the First Amend-
ment or as no constitutional violation at all.
247. At least where there is a possibility that school children may be coerced by an
act, Justice Kennedy seems to raise a "higher" wall of separation. He has consistently
been less tolerant of prayers at schools, such as in Lee and Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. In
other aspects, Justice Kennedy has voted in a more accommodationist fashion, such as
with public displays containing religious themes as in Alleghany and Capital Square,
with tuition voucher programs that help pay for tuition at religious schools as in
Zelman, and tax exemptions for religious charities as in Camps Newfound/Owatonna
v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
248. See Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 360-61.
249. DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 109
(2002)(noting that court of appeals judges occasionally construct lower court
opinions with a certain Supreme Court Justice's viewpoint in mind).
250. Alleghany, 492 U.S. at 657, 679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)(stating "the Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in
recognizing and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society... ITihe
principles of the Establishment Clause and our Nation's historic traditions of diversity
and pluralism allow communities to make reasonable judgments respecting the
accommodation of acknowledgement of holidays with both cultural and religious
aspects." )(noting that adherence to the endorsement test would deem many historical
and patriotic activities unconstitutional).
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CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence, which leaves important issues in limbo. It
will be interesting to observe how lower courts now deal with similar
issues that are sure to arise. If another court follows the Newdow I
approach and strikes down the school-led Pledge on one or more
Establishment Clause tests, it could force the Supreme Court into more
clearly defining the law.
A future case decided on grounds similar to Newdow I, but with
proper standing, will leave the Supreme Court with three options.
First, the Court may uphold or strike down the Pledge using an
existing test. Although it is unclear at this time which one of the many
tests may gain acceptance by a majority of the Court, it will not be the
Lemon test on its own. This may provide further clarity of ceremonial
deism issues but may open the Court to critics pointing to the fact that
the analysis would change under alternative tests. Second, the Court
may employ no test at all and again suffer criticism and provide less
precision in this legal area. Finally, as it appears five members may be
willing to do, the Court may follow Justice O'Connor and carve out an
exception to the Establishment Clause for ceremonial deism or find
that ceremonial deism is not a violation and thus there is no need for
an exception. In any event, it appears that Justice Kennedy may pro-
vide future guidance in this area, as his swing vote may also grant him
opinion writing responsibilities.
Whatever the future outcome, hopefully the High Court will bring
some measure of stability and clarity to Establishment Clause juris-
prudence. It is a complicated area of law, requiring some type of gui-
dance to avoid inconsistencies. While avoiding controversial or
uncomfortable topics may be accepted, and in fact desired in social
settings, it is up to the Supreme Court - the final legal authority - to
answer difficult questions. Although it will be a difficult task, hope-
fully the Court will be more willing in the future to provide guidance to
all parties involved and establish some consistency and lucidity to the
Establishment Clause.
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